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Orthodoxy and Revisionism
in American Demography
DENNIS HODGSON
IN HIS 1986 PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE Population Association of America,
Paul Demeny (1986: 473) noted a "substantial shift" occurring among
"knowledgeable observers" of the demographic scene: a move away from
viewing high fertility and rapid population growth as problems. "Revision-
ists" are attacking "orthodoxy," some even proclaiming a "happy banish-
ment of the population problem." Such a shift in perspective is reminiscent
of the 1950s, when what Demeny labeled "orthodoxy" rose as a counterpoint
to a demographic transition theory view of Third World population growth
(Hodgson, 1983: 10-20). In the United States the development of demo-
graphic thought relating population growth and development evidently has
not followed the scientific ideal of an early stage of incomplete knowledge
being replaced by a later stage of more complete knowledge as theory is
continually molded to better fit reality. Sharp breaks, not steady refinement,
mark its path. Why?
There are those ("internalists") who see paradigmatic change within
the social sciences as being basically independent of outside forces, and others
("externalists") who see social, economic, and political conditions as being
the prime determinants of such change (Unseem, 1976: 147-148). An in-
ternalist analysis of American demographic thought on population and de-
velopment would highlight the periodic inability of accepted theory to explain
or predict a changing demographic reality. An externalist analysis would
highlight how changing historical conditions periodically alter the agenda
of those examining this relationship, inducing them to view it from a different
angle. Each approach warrants examination. Both "internal" and "external"
factors behind the rise of orthodoxy in the 1950s and revisionism today will
be investigated.
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The emergence of orthodoxy in
American demography: 1945-65
From the vantage point of the late 1980s, what passes for orthodoxy in
American demography is a perspective founded on two basic assumptions:
rapid population growth in nonindustrial societies is a significant problem,
and providing contraceptives to peasant couples can lower fertility prior to
industrialization. Under orthodoxy, demographic trends are viewed as de-
terminants of economic trends, rapid population growth as a cause of con-
tinued underdevelopment. Lowering fertility becomes a way of facilitating
structural change.
Yet orthodoxy's novel assertion about the possibility of induced fertility
decline in agrarian societies is nowhere to be found in 1945. The consensus
of American demographers then was that demographic change occurs in
response to structural change. With the formulation of transition theory in
the mid-1940s (Kirk, 1944; Notestein, 1945; Davis, 1945; Thompson, 1946),
American demographers had produced a unified theory apparently capable
of explaining worldwide demographic trends. All demographic trends, es-
pecially fertility decline, were viewed as being responses to the variety of
structural changes commonly subsumed under the rubric of "the modern-
ization process." In a very real sense transition theory represented the cul-
mination of 60 years of research on the socioeconomic determinants of
Western fertility decline. Transition demographers felt comfortable arguing
that the fertility level of any society could be understood by analyzing the
components of its social system (Notestein, 1945: 39-40; Davis, 1948: 561-
562); it was "determined" by socioeconomic conditions.
Sixty years of demographic research implied that access to contraception
played a minor role in "explaining" fertility decline. True, much of Western
fertility decline was due to couples practicing birth control, but access to
birth control had never been viewed as an independent variable affecting
fertility (Notestein, 1945: 40). The timing and extent of Western fertility
decline had not been related to advances in contraceptive technology. In
most Western countries the spread of contraception took place in a hostile
envirormient, with governments and religions expressing strong opposition.
Long ago it had been concluded that fertility declined when the motivation
to have children changed, not the ability to control fertility (Thompson, 1930:
115-116; Stix and Notestein, 1940: 150). Motivation changed in response
to structural changes in the social system.
Inducing fertility decline by improving access to birth control had been
viewed as dubious policy back in 1930 (Thompson: 331-332):
Great social changes do not take place by fiat. They must evolve slowly in
response to changed conditions of life, as adjustments to an alteration in the
status of individuals in the social and economic life of the community. An
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even more effective way to spread the practice of birth control than by mere
propaganda is to aid those changes in social organization and individual status
that will demand a new adaptation on the part of every person, an adaptation
in which the advantages of smaller families will be obvious.
Regine Stix and Frank Notestein (1940: 153) spoke in similar terms: "The
situation will not be altered by making modern contraception available to
populations that have not utilized the folkway methods at their disposal."
Gilbert Beebe (1942: 89) had explained why: "If the role of woman be that
of wife and mother, with no vital functions taking her from home and family,
and with important values realizable only in and through a large family,
large families follow as a matter of course." According to transition analysis
industrialization was a necessary prerequisite for fertility decline (Moore,
1945: 121): "Nor is any immediate solution for crowding on the land to be
found in declining fertility. Falling birth rates may only be expected in an
urban, industrial environment."
Yet by the mid-1930s a new view was being adopted by American
demographers (Davis, 1954: 87-88): "India has a chance to be the first
country to achieve a major revolution in human life—the platmed diffusion
of fertility control in a peasant population prior to, and for the benefit of,
the urban-industrial transition." Philip Hauser (1958: 14-15) noted that
"most students of population in Western countries" had adopted "a neo-
Malthusian position" that sees "reduced rates of population growth as es-
sential aspects of long-run social and economic advances in the densely
peopled agrarian societies of today's world."
Were there "internal" factors behind the rise of orthodoxy? Did the
transition framework lose its ability to explain worldwide demographic
trends? Did orthodoxy arise because it was better able to do so?
Internal factors
Demographic trends from 1945 to 1955, both in industrial and nonindustrial
societies, did raise questions about the adequacy of transition theory. Within
some industrial societies transition theory lost its explanatory power when
the long-term decline in fertility ended and a sharp upward movement began.
American demographers had focused their attention upon the diffusion of
conscious fertility control throughout the populations of industrializing and
urbanizing societies. When this diffusion neared completion. Western fer-
tility trends suddenly became unpredictable and "unexplainable" within the
transition framework. Although demographers had considered "moderni-
zation" to be a process—a term that implied the existence of a beginning
and end—they had not refiected upon what factors might become the prime
determinants of fertility trends after the pattern of consciously controlled
fertility had spread to a substantial majority of a population. They assumed
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that no significant fertility changes (at least no sharp upward movements)
would occur after the birth rate reached low levels. This assumption proved
wrong.
The loss of transition theory's explanatory power for fertility in in-
dustrial societies was mainly a theoretical problem for the discipline. The
same sharp upward trend in fertility that belied the label given industrial
societies by transition theorists—areas of "incipient decline"—also brought
a resolution to the major perceived "population problem" of this group of
societies: the prospect of depopulation. Few outside the field were trau-
matized by the baby boom. For those in the field, its appearance marked the
end of an era. The agenda in place since the turn of the century, understanding
the reasons behind Western fertility decline, dissolved as the boom erased
fears of depopulation.
In the nonindustrial world an "unexpected" trend became evident to
American demographers during the 1950s: rapid mortality decline that "did
not depend on general economic development" (Davis, 1956a: 314, 1956c;
Stolnitz, 1955, 1956a, 1956b). Transition theory had emphasized the role
played by socioeconomic development in bringing about mortality decline
(Taeuber, 1958: 257): "Economic advance and social change were necessary
bases for improving health and declining mortality." Western mortality de-
cline was thought to be primarily due to the improvements in diet and housing
associated with rising levels of living. Mortality decline in colonies was pri-
marily credited to mother countries implementing changes that increased
the food supply and improved the transportation system. Even public health
innovations and medical advances were thought to require the adoption of
Western science, public education, and "other institutions of modem society"
(Davis, 1948: 609). Mid-century mortality trends caused many to question
the transition notion that mortality decline was basically a consequence of
economic development.
George Stolnitz (1955: 53), for example, noted that the factors re-
sponsible for the dramatic downturn in the mortality of "the world's im-
poverished nations" were "all of recent origin" and not the same as those
that had lowered Western mortality: "The primary role of international rather
than national health agencies, the use of antibiotics, the development of
cheap yet effective methods for combating malaria—each of these is very
nearly a mid-century innovation." Kingsley Davis (1956a: 314) highlighted
the fact that contemporary mortality decline was divorced from the process
of economic development, caused by the "diffusion of death-control tech-
niques which did not depend on the diffusion of other cultural elements or
basic changes in the institutions and customs of the people affected." A
"paradoxical" association of rapid population growth and continued wide-
spread poverty arose, a "grotesque" example of "human self-frustration"
(Davis, 1956c: 53). Davis argued (1956a: 318) that "economic development
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alone cannot be counted on to save a situation over which it has so little
control and by which it is itself so greatly influenced."
Mortality decline accelerated population growth in an alarming man-
ner. Earlier notions about what constituted a "high" rate of population
growth had evolved from study ofthe Western experience. Rates of over 1.5
percent a year were commonly considered quite high. During the period
from 1950 to 1954 Davis (1956c: 58) noted that Costa Rica averaged a 3.7
percent annual increase, Formosa a 3.5 percent increase, Malaya a 3.0 per-
cent increase, Mexico a 2.9 percent increase, and the list went on. Al-
though population/resource concerns made the immediate postwar popula-
tion crisis an especially "Asiatic" one, early on (Vance, 1952) it was recog-
nized that "simple and inexpensive" methods of death control threatened
the modernization chances of all nonindustrialized societies. Rapid popula-
tion growth that was not a consequence of economic development might very
well prove its nemesis.
American economists during the 1950s emphasized the role played by
capital accumulation in the development process. tJnderdevelopment rep-
resented a workforce with little capital stock, and development was a process
of adding to that stock. Rapid population growth produced high dependency
ratios that increased the need for "demographic investments" and thereby
limited the capital available for more directly productive investments. Some
theorists (Leibenstein, 1954; Nelson, 1956) developed models describing a
"low-level equilibrium trap" in which population growth stymied growth
of per capita income. The specter of growing numbers living at subsistence
levels, making economic development increasingly improbable, was pre-
sented as a real possibility (Leibenstein, 1954: 70, 194). Others (Coale and
Hoover, 1958; Enke, 1963) quantified the economic cost of continued high
fertility and found it substantial. Demographic trends affected both econo-
mists and demographers, and the fears of each heightened those of the other
(Taeuber, 1958: 251-252): "The present world-wide controversy on feasible
rates of eeonotnic development and probable rates of population increase is
a product of this new situation in which the reduction of mortality is freed
temporarily from necessary relations with economic developments." If rapid
population growth were forestalling the economic transformation that could
bring about fertility decline, transition theorists had a crisis and no humane
solution.
Detailed demographic studies of rapid mortality decline reinforced these
fears. Countries with high fertility traditionally have a high proportion of
their population in the younger ages. It was found (Lorimer, 1951; Coale,
1956; Stolnitz, 1958) that the postwar mortality decline, because it occurred
most sharply in the younger age groups, was actually further increasing the
proportion of the young. By the end of the 1950s it was not uncommon for
a Third World country to have nearly half its population under the age of
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15. A situation in which there was one person in the nonproductive ages
for every individual in the economically active years seemed to document a
"demographic stumbling block" to economic development efforts. Any coun-
try doubling its population every 25 years, irrespective of its current size and
density, would have difficulty industrializing. By the late 1950s all rapidly
growing Third World populations, Latin American and African as well as
Asian, were assumed to be demographically handicapped in their struggle
to industrialize.
So there is in fact a plausible "internalist" explanation for why the
transition framework was questioned during the 1950s. Mortality decline
caused by "extraeconotnic factors" (Davis, 1958a: 9) resulted in unprece-
dented rates of population growth that made it no longer so easy to view
"population trends as a function of 'progress' " (Kirk, 1944: 28). Yet what
of orthodoxy's novel assertion that fertility in agrarian societies could be
lowered directly? Again, it ran counter to 60 years of research on the de-
terminants of fertility trends. Did it rest on new demographic evidence of
access to contraception inducing fertility decline among peasant populations?
No. The absence of such evidence, more than its presence, was responsible
for the rise of this view. Empirical support for this novel assertion was slight.
Davis (1950: 17) could point to women in "a rural section of India" re-
sponding to a question—"How many living children should a woman have
when she is 40?"—with a "modal preference for two or three children" as
evidence of an "incipient" fertility decline that might be activated with an
"all-out governmental campaign to diffuse contraception." Notestein (1953)
could write that Bulgarian fertility had recently declined while that society
was still predominately agrarian. Such internalist explanations for the rise
of orthodoxy's novel assertion seem strained.
External factors
It was nondemographic factors present at mid-century, factors that made it
difficult to view fertility with a disinterested eye, that made American de-
mographers advocate providing peasants with contraceptives to lower fer-
tility. The unbalanced vital rates of the nonindustrial world were thought to
be an inherently unstable and hence transitory phenomenon whose de-
nouement would be either a return of high mortality or fertility decline.
Given the paucity of urban-industrial development, transition analyses gen-
erated predictions of mortality increase, but now these predictions were used
as a foil to convince skeptics of the necessity of bringing contraception to
peasants (Davis, 1951: 230-231; 1953: 17; Notestein, 1950: 343-344;
Vance, 1952). Orthodoxy was as much a development strategy as a de-
mographic perspective: induced fertility decline could forestall famine, eco-
nomic catastrophe, and political turmoil in the nonindustrial world, while
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permitting gradual structural change and steady economic growth. This was
a very desirable scenario, and not just for demographic reasons.
Back in 1946 the unbalanced vital rates resulting from colonial dom-
ination had been labeled "the Malthusian dilemma of all colonialism"
(Thompson: 313), and the demise of the colonial system was predicted. That
came to pass. The collapse of the colonial system coincided with the arrival
of the Cold War. The sharp postwar drop in mortality took on new political
implications. The ensuing rapid population growth threatened to thwart the
industrialization plans of Third World nations, many of them newly inde-
pendent. Retrograde or stagnant economic conditions were thought to be a
breeding ground for communism. This coalescing of historical conditions
gave added urgency to curtailing rapid population growth, especially in Asia
(Taeuber, 1965: 79): "Given the delayed modernization, the synchronization
of nationalist awakening and communist political advance, and the coin-
cidence of both these with the scientific and technological advances in mor-
tality control, Asia's problems of population, development, and war become
hazards not alone to Asia but to the whole world." First foundations and
later governments were willing to infuse millions of dollars in what was then
a quite small discipline for research that might aid in controlling fertility.
The Cold War, the end of colonialism, and the availability of funds for
population control were "external" factors that assured orthodoxy's rise and
helped mold its contours. They warrant a detailed examination.
The Cold War The polarization of the world into "free" and "communist
bloc" during the 1950s was a change affecting everyone's vision. Other
changes were examined to detect how they might influence this overarching
competition. "The bi-polar contest overshadows all other aspects of contem-
porary world politics. Almost all specific issues, from population problems
to uses of nuclear energy must be considered in its context" (Hauser, 1958:
15). The "uncotnmitted" third of the world was a "prize" to be won in a
struggle between "the Communist and the free worlds" (Davis, 1936b: 354;
Hauser, 1958: 14). Which model of development, Soviet or capitalist, would
these nations adopt? "If the underdeveloped Communist nations demon-
strate that they can achieve more rapid economic progress than the under-
developed Western nations, the free way of life may well be doomed" (Hau-
ser, 1964: 119). Which side would benefit from continued rapid population
grovs^? "Success or failure in this fateful contest may well hinge on the
ability of the nations involved to decrease their rates of population growth"
(ibid). The Cold War forced policymakers and academics to face such ques-
tions; it helped mold a new agenda for demography.
If demographers had used transition analysis to answer these questions,
a politically awkward situation would have arisen. The transition framework
considered fertility decline to be largely the consequence of industrialization.
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The only solution to the problem of rapid population growth that directly
flowed from this framework was stimulating rapid and extensive industri-
alization. The more rapid the population growth, the more rapid the in-
dustrialization had to be.
The Soviet Union was then the prime twentieth century example of
planned and very rapid industrialization. In fact, during the early 1940s the
Soviet case had even been used as an exemplar of how to deal with the
"population problem." Notestein (1943: 173) had observed that "during the
past twelve years she [the Soviet Union] has made the most rapid progress
in industrialization that the world has ever seen." Furthermore he had argued
that, with the Soviet Union's "enviable record in dealing with ethnic het-
erogeneity" and future potential for development, a solution to Eastern Eu-
rope's "demographic problems may be rapid" if this area were "absorbed"
by the Soviet Union. He had even concluded his analysis (1943: 174) by
observing that "the Soviet Union, given a little political luck, will be the
strongest single power in the world, and will occupy a dominant position
on the Eurasian Continent."
In the early 1940s such statements might be understandable. The ex-
ample of a nation with a planned and very rapid industrialization experience
was heartening for Observers who then believed that industrialization nec-
essarily preceded fertility decline and who looked for a solution to the prob-
lems posed by population growth. But when America's former ally became
its most feared competitor, when the Third World became an arena in which
the competition was fought, and when rapid population growth appeared
to foreclose the possibility of repeating the Western indilstrialization se-
quence, such thinking might no longer appear either understandable or
defensible. The 1950s was such a time.
Mid-century social, political, economic, and demographic conditions
were judged propitious for the spread of communism (Taeuber, 1958: 243):
"The very factors of poverty, ill health, and ignorance that make the creation
of responsible democratic governments so difficult render people susceptible
to the Communist appeal. And the present interrelations of poverty and
population density in the agrarian societies reserve the high fertility that
sends populations upward while slowing the possible developments that might
lead to reduced fertility and lessened growth." Analysis of regional economic
trends (Kuznets, 1958) indicated that over the first half of this century the
income gap between the less and more developed regions had increased and
that while income inequality had lessened within developed regions it had
increased within less developed regions. Simon Kuznets was led to conclude
(1958: 116):
The political misery of the poor, the tension created by the observation of the
much greater growth of other communities, the failure to utilize the patently
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increasing potential of economic produaion and welfare, may only have in-
creased. . . . There is a clear probability of intemal tensions that provide
drives directed simultaneously at some higher level of over-all economic per-
formance and, perhaps contradictory, at a rapid equalization of income and
opportunities. It takes little imagination to spell out the consequences of such
a situation, (emphasis in original)
The consequence most clear to American demographers was the need
to solve the population problem. With the United States having yet to include
a birth control component in its foreign aid programs, demographers found
themselves employing Cold War arguments in an attempt to influence US
policymakers:
The weapon the free world is mainly dependent upon to assure that the
uncommitted part of the world will at least be neutral, if not pro-free world,
is that of providing technical assistance designed to raise levels of living. The
success of the free world's technical assistance programs may well depend on
the satisfactory solution of the population problem. (Hauser, 1934: 187-188)
What the United States would like to see them [leaders of underdeveloped
countries] do is to foster peaceful and democratic industrialization, a rising
level of living, and, in general, adherence to our side. To this end we have
given or lent money for agriculture, industry, transportation, public health and
arms. We have maintained that this is an effective way to head off Communism
because, as we say, chronic poverty breeds Communism. This reasoning has
much to commend it, but it ignores population trends and thus runs the danger
of underestimating or misinterpreting the requirements for economic devel-
opment. (Davis, 1958b: 296)
Interestingly, when President Lyndon Johnson (1966: 321) flrst asked Con-
gress for fertility control funds, he did so on the basis that high population
growth rates "challenge our own security." In the Cold War years of the
1950s American demographers adopting the orthodox view were gaining a
solution to both a population and a political crisis, while simultaneously
losing an association with a perspective that considered the Third World's
population and economic problems a legacy of Western colonialism.
Cold War concerns might also be responsible for orthodoxy's emphasis
on a family planning approach to population control. Attention at mid-
century was focused on "the race between India and Communist China,"
between "the Communist approach" and "democratic methods" (Hauser,
1964: 119). With this contest being "watched with intense interest by the
peoples of underdeveloped areas throughout the world" (Hagen, 1958: 127),
its outcome was thought to be of great importance to the "Western bloc."
In the Indian government the United States had an ally who accepted "the
fact that both econotnic advance and the slowing of population growth can
be achieved through democratic processes" (Taeuber, 1958: 252). Voluntary
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family planning was an attempt at population control that, although proh-
lematic from a demographic point of view (assuming, as it did, that peasants
would simply avail themselves of the services offered), was "democratic."
It was quite compatible with the free world's overall development strategy
for the uncommitted world. Any contention that coercive hirth control might
he needed to control the population of India and so save it from the evils of
totalitarian communism, although corresponding more closely with past
demographic research, would hardly have been so compatible.
Decolonization Nationalist sentiment mobilized the masses, and colonial
empires crumbled during the postwar era. The decolonization of the world
was a change of immense significance. With political independence came a
rise in expectations and the universal quest for industrialization. With the
allegiance of newly independent nations being sought in a "bi-polar world,"
their hopes and problems became a matter of concern to policymakers and
academics in the United States.
The original formulators of transition theory in the United States ex-
panded its explanatory power beyond the industrialized world by including
a "colonial explanation" of the nonindustrial world's demographic trends
(Kirk, 1944: 28-35; Notestein, 1945: 50-57; Davis, 1945: 5-11; Thompson,
1946: 251-318). Colonies had an attenuated modernization experience that
caused mortality to fall but not fertility. Colonial powers, seeking an assured
source of raw materials and a productive labor force, consistently introduced
certain changes in their colonies: the rationalization and commercialization
of agriculture, the maintenance of internal order, improvements in trans-
portation and communication, and the control of disease. Famines and ep-
idemics declined. But colonial powers, desiring markets for their own man-
ufactured goods, prevented or failed to foster industrialization in their
colonies. The changes that led to lower fertility in the West did not occur,
fertility remained high, and populations grew. This explanation placed the
"blame" for unbalanced vital rates on the unwillingness of colonial powers
to foster industrialization in their colonies.
Decolonization vitiated transition theory's colonial explanation. With
political independence came the universal desire to implement programs of
rapid industrialization; no longer could unbalanced vital rates be explained
by any lack of such desire. With Third World governments, not colonial
powers, setting policy, the way unbalanced vital rates returned to equilibrium
would be influenced by their action or inaction. Ideologically this meant that
responsibility for continued population problems could be passed from the
First World to the Third World (Taeuber, 1958: 259): "Since the responsi-
bilities of leadership now inhere in the peoples themselves, evasion of a
population aspect to economic difficulties and political instabilities can no
longer proceed through condemnations of colonial systems." Practically this
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meant that American demographers concerned with the nonindustrial
world's demographic trends had a new audience to address: Third World
leaders. This change in audience was to have a profound impact on de-
mography in the United States.
What message did American demographers have for these leaders?
Nearly all (Vance, 1952; Taeuber, 1952: 37; Notestein, 1953: 25; Davis,
1953: 17) had concluded that current high levels of population growth made
impossible a repetition of the Western sequence of economic and demo-
graphic change. Matters were more serious: a real population crisis existed.
With "the high rate of capital formation which Communist countries can
maintain through totalitarian methods" (Hagen, 1958: 122) thought to give
an edge to the Soviet model of rapid industrialization, recommending any
developmentalist solution to this crisis was problematic. With the special
ideological attractiveness of the communist development strategy to newly
independent peoples having been recognized (Watnick, 1952), a central task
for American demographers became convincing Third World leaders that
population control was both needed and possible.
Simulation studies, such as that of Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover
(1958), were begun "to let us study what the economic consequences of
alternative courses of events would be" (Notestein, 1954: 168). Calculating
the costs of continued high fertility and the benefits of lower fertility played
to the development hopes and fears of Third World leaders and helped
convince them of the need for fertility control. Knowledge, attitude, and
practice (KAP) surveys were undertaken throughout the Third World. Their
findings, which seemed to show most respondents desirous of controlling
their fertility, were used to convince often-skeptical leaders that effective
family planning programs were possible (Berelson, 1964: 11). Foundations
funded the establishment of graduate-level population programs at American
universities focusing on Third World problems and of fellowship programs
that brought many Third World students to them. Here they learned to view
fertility in an orthodox fashion, as a malleable variable capable of being
shaped to meet the development needs of their societies.
The decolonization of the nonindustrial world affected American de-
mography by changing its audience, influencing its choice of topics, and
attracting to it new levels of funding that dramatically affected its size and
shape.
Funds for fertility control Funds for fertility control began flowing in
1952. John D. Rockefeller 3rd, concerned with the growing imbalance in
Asiatic vital rates, called a conference at Williamsburg, Virginia, under the
auspices of the US National Academy of Sciences to examine the effects of
population growth (Notestein, 1982: 676-677; Bachrach and Bergman,
1973: 44-46; Population Council, 1977). Five months later the Population
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Council was founded with Rockefeller as its president. During that same year
the Ford Foundation began funding population activities (Caldwell and Cald-
well, 1986: 32). Until the mid-1960s, when the US government began ex-
pending large sums, the majority of funds suppori;ing global feri;ility control
came from the Ford Foundation and various Rockefeller sources, much of
it funneled through the Population Council.
The concerns that led to this funding were, in many ways, similar to
those influencing demographers. Rockefeller (1974: 2-3), reminiscing about
the eariy years of his involvement with the Council, reflected on his moti-
vations: "For many years a sense of urgency caused me to concentrate on
the family planning approach. It was generally recognized in those days that
industrialization led to low birth rates, but there were few countries that had
the capital and the resources to industrialize." Notestein (1968: 553), in
relating the original mandate given the staff by the trustees of the Council,
revealed their concerns: "Believing as they did that the mounting tempo of
growth among the world's poorest people represented a major threat to social-
economic development, to political stability, and indeed to human freedom,
they were concerned with the problems of population growth."
During the 1950s both the Ford Foundation and the Population Council
emphasized research over action (Piotrow, 1973: 14—15). Reproductive phys-
iology and demographic research were the two areas highlighted. Research
on oral contraceptives and intrauterine devices produced great optimism
about improvements in contraceptive technology. The public, already feeling
the first stirrings of the sexual revolution, became more accepting of the open
discussion of sexual topics. The foundations' inhibitions about supporting
"action" programs to control fertility lessened and by the early 1960s sub-
stantial funds for direct technical assistance began flowing.
The expenditures on demography had a profound impact. In 1950 it
was taught at the graduate level in only three places. Seven additional pro-
grams were added between 1951 and 1961, nine more between 1961 and
1967 (Stycos, 1967). From 1952 to 1968 a dozen population centers in the
United States were the recipients of major Ford Foundation funding (Caldwell
and Caldwell, 1986). The Population Council aided demography's rapid
growth with its fellowship program and institutional grants. These funds
changed a small group of scholars sharing an interest in a subject matter
into a substantial group of researchers attempting to resolve a crisis.
The growth of demography was not limited to training centers. Begin-
ning in the 1960s numerous journals were launched in a field that formerly
had only a bibliographic index as a national journal. Two of these were
directly published by the Population Council {Studies in Family Planning and
Population and Development Review), another was started with seed money
from the Ford Foundation (Demography), and still another relied for funds
on the US Agency for International Development (International Pamily Plan-
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ning Perspectives). Funds for fertility control both expanded and shaped Amer-
ican demographic literature.
In the mid-1960s the US govemment began to expend significant funds
on fertility control. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare expen-
ditures increased from $4.6 million in 1965 to $14.7 tnillion in 1969; USAID
funding increased from $10.5 million in 1965 to $45.4 million in 1969 and
to $123 tnillion by 1972 (Caldwell and Caldwell 1986: 102-104). Most of
the funds came to flow through the Office of Population at USAID, which
did not follow the same strategy as had the foundations. For a variety of
reasons—some personal, relating to the convictions of its director of popu-
lation activities; and some institutional, relating to a different specification
of its mission—USAID resolved to expend funds so as to maximize their
immediate impact on fertility (Warwick, 1982: 45-51). Most of its money
was spent to support family plarming programs, with only a small portion
going to research or institutional support.
Institutionalizing orthodoxy
Funding for fertility control had its biggest impact on American demography
by institutionalizing an orthodox agenda. Edward Shils (1970: 763) has aptly
defined the process:
By institutionalization of an intellectual activity I mean the relatively dense
interaction of persons who perform that activity. The higb degree of institu-
tionalization of an intellectual activity entails its teaching and investigation
within a regulated, scheduled, and systematically administered organization.
It also entails the organized support of the activity from outside the particular
institution and the reception or use of the results of the activity beyond the
boundaries of the institution.
Institutionalization was the initial goal of those funding fertility control
research. The organizations they established, such as the Population Council
and the university-based population centers, provided the "relatively dense
interaction" of persons engaged in the effort. Funding decisions directed
academic attention to global population issues and produced individuals
trained in a variety of academic specialties who had an interest in such issues.
Contracts for fertility control research produced findings that could be put
to use by governments and private organizations in developing their family
planning programs. By the late 1960s this research had acquired all the
characteristics of a well-institutionalized intellectual activity.
This institutionalization affected demography in two major ways. First,
during decades when compelling evidence was lacking that family planning
programs could lower fertility in agrarian societies, earmarking the majority
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of population research and training funds explicitly for family planning work
(Bachrach and Bergman, 1973: 58-60) kept orthodoxy firmly entrenched
within the discipline. Training centers were established that had an "inter-
national" orientation, with a curriculum focused on Third World population
problems. Population centers accepting Ford Foundation funds were asked
to make a "commitment" that "much of the money would be spent on Third
World students and a considerable part of the balance on US students with
Third World interests" (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1986: 61). A significant
component of the funding of most population centers was "soft" contracts
for family planning program development and evaluation research. This
institutional environment did not foster much questioning of orthodox as-
sumptions (Demerath, 1976: 54).
Second, the institutionalization of fertility control research gave it a life
of its own, independent of demography. Other professionals, not concemed
with disciplinary questions, were engaged in bringing about global fertility
control. Medical and biological scientists were employed to develop new
contraceptives, public health specialists to integrate the provision of birth
control services into health care delivery systems, communications specialists
to develop information campaigns. They did not have as their goal the fur-
thering of demographic knowledge. Their goal was to develop ways of low-
ering fertility. Bernard Berelson described the situation in 1971 (p. 182):
A decade or more ago, when population was a relatively disregarded and
financially poor field, it "belonged" to the professional demographer, univer-
sity-based. To-day, when it is both popular and rich, it "belongs" to others as
well—to non-demographic newcomers from the behavioral sciences, to "family
planners" from tbe public bealth and medical fields, to bio-ecologists suddenly
expressing grand rights of eminent domain, to lawyers or social workers or
geographers or educators or political scientists attracted by the problem and/
or the prospects. The broad field of demography, or even of population studies,
has recently been "contaminated" by alien (wrong?) notions, by different
(lower?) standards, by demographic illiteracy, by "action."
Much of American demography became a subsidiary of a larger en-
terprise that "sought to assign to social science research on population issues
the role of handmaiden in family planning programs" (Demeny, 1988: 466).
The multidisciplinary fertility control effort was committed to a goal, not to
a discipline or a method for approaching truth. Demography did not direct
this effort, but only provided it with certain specialized services. The very
"creation of university population programs was only an intermediate ob-
jective in the [Ford] Foundation's objectives" (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1986:
143); the ultimate objective was limiting population growth. To some extent,
demography, with its theoretical baggage of transition theory, had to be
supplemented (Bogue, 1965: 724): "The raison d'etre for family planning
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research is the recognition that none of the theories or hypotheses being
explored hy traditional demography can provide the basis for a stepped-up
'crash' program for fertility reduction."
Politicizing demography
Funds for fertility control eventually worked to politicize American demog-
raphy. Advocacy of global fertility control came to be identified, with some
justification, as a policy position of the First World. Like "the links of a food
chain" (Notestein, 1971: 82), the actions of a few concerned and influential
individuals in the United States led to the involvement of foundations, uni-
versities, governments, and finally international organizations in this effort.
By the end ofthe 1960s quite a number of voices were carrying the message:
the World Bank, USAID, a number of Western governments, a variety of
United Nations agencies, economists and demographers trained in Western
universities, to name a few. Fertility control was one activity for which a
Third World goverrunent could easily find First World monetary support
(Piotrow, 1973: 145-158). This advocacy of Third World fertility control hy
First World institutions raised questions about motives. Controversy came
to surround the issue, as evidenced at the World Population Conference at
Bucharest in 1974.
Those initiating the conference, principally the United States, plarmed
it to be a staging ground for a united worldwide effort to lower fertility
(Finkle and Crane, 1975: 87). Yet the "world" divided. The head of the
Indian delegation asserted "development is the best contraceptive" and was
greeted with "the acclaim of most Third World participants" (Ford Foun-
dation, 1985: 18). This slogan was not a call for dismantling family planning
programs, and there was no such dismantling after the conference. It was a
slogan that questioned motives and made a statement about priorities.
Discussion ofthe true nature or real extent of Third World "population"
problems became the context for a global political debate (Finkle and Crane,
1975: 89; Mauldin et al., 1974: 377; Carder, 1974). The problems focused
on were real ones: food shortages, underdevelopment, unemployment. But
when assessing who or what was responsible for them, each side tended to
adopt an interpretation that minimized its responsibility. The view that con-
tinued underdevelopment, unemployment, and malnutrition were funda-
mentally "population problems" had great attraction to policymakers in the
First World. The cause of and the solution to problems could then be found
in the Third World itself: rapid population growth was the cause and fertility
control was the solution. What was needed from the First World was only
the modest amounts of money and technical advice that were necessary to
establish a fertility control program. President Johnson, perhaps too bluntly,
had stated the case in 1965 (Piotrow, 1973: 90):"Let us act on the fact that
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less than five dollars invested in population control is worth a hundred dollars
invested in econornic growth."
The view that underdevelopment, unemployment, malnutrition, and
rapid population growth were fundamentally caused hy the ties of depen-
dency that had bound and still hind the Third World to the developed world
had great attraction to Third World policymakers. A solution to these proh-
lems, then, required a glohal redistribution of wealth and power: a new
intemational economic order. Without it, glohal chaos, only one element of
which was an "overpopulated" world, was likely to result. This solution
required much from the First World. With the United States already having
ohjected to a new intemational economic order, few Third World leaders at
Bucharest, even those with active family planning programs at home, could
resist making a point ahout the misplaced priorities of the United States
(Finkle and Crane, 1975: 109).
In the context of this political dehate, orthodoxy took on a decided
political coloration. Since the late 1940s orthodox demographers had heen
identifying rapid population growth as a hasic cause of Third World prohlems.
During the 1950s they worked diligently to convince First and Third World
policymakers of the need for fertility control and to document its feasibility.
When motives were questioned in the late 1960s, they found themselves
deeply committed, hy past research and often hy current employment, to a
demographic etiology of Third World prohlems. At Bucharest they found
themselves in the center of a highly charged political arena.
Ever since the first UN-sponsored population conference in 1954, or-
thodox demographers had faced the standard Marxist critique of neo-Mal-
thusianism: a shroud used to mask imperialism and colonialism (Ryabushkin,
1954). With the deepening US involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s,
this critique found growing receptivity even at home (Barclay, Enright, and
Reynolds, 1970; Pradervand, 1970). The early and continuing interest of
rich industrialists in population control was used to document its capitalist
nature. Feminists (Mass, 1972, 1974; Gordon, 1974, 1976) highlighted links
to the older eugenics movement, laheling Davis, Clyde Kiser, Notestein,
Dudley Kirk, and Frank Lorimer "eugenist demographers" (Gordon, 1976:
396). Such questioning of scientific legitimacy hy "unmasking" ideological
roots was usually ignored hy orthodox demographers, although occasionally
countered in kind (Stycos, 1974). At Bucharest, though, an opponent of
orthodoxy more insidious than Marxism emerged: a liheral version of de-
velopmentalism.
The argument that development will motivate couples to have smaU
families sprang more fi-om analysis of the Western experience than from
Marxist theory. The failure of over a decade of family planning to suhstantially
lower fertility in a numher of societies had already led some to question it
as a method of population control (Davis, 1967; Mamdani, 1972); giving
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contraceptives to peasant couples not desirous of small families would not
lower fertility. Still considering rapid population growth a serious problem,
some of the disenchanted argued for more coercive forms of population
control (Davis, 1967: 738), while others called for redirecting development
benefits to the impoverished to hasten their adoption of small-family ideals
(Rich, 1973; Kocher, 1973). The political, economic, social, and ethical
feasibility of coercive measures could be questioned by the orthodox (Ber-
elson, 1969), but the "developmentalist" position proved more difficult to
counter. The World Bank under Robert McNamara moved in a develop-
mentalist direction (World Bank, 1974) and John D. Rockefeller 3rd (1974:
4) armounced his conversion at Bucharest: "I now strongly believe that the
only viable course is to place population policy solidly within the context of
general economic and social development."
The adoption of a developmentalist World Population Plan of Action
at Bucharest was a political defeat for the United States and for orthodoxy.
This position became de rigueur within the international community and was
adopted by the Population Council (Population Council, 1978: 113-126)
and by many American demographers. Some argued, though, that integrating
family planning into general development programs constituted no great
challenge to orthodoxy since "it challenges none ofthe assumptions on which
the need for population control is based" (Carder, 1974: 9). Distributing
contraceptives as part of programs aimed at meeting basic needs might simply
be a way of inducing greater numbers of the poor to accept and use them.
In one way, however, a developmentalist position was a change from
orthodoxy. Assuming that development and fertility control could proceed
hand in hand assumed a population problem significantly less virulent than
the one perceived in the 1950s. Such a growth in optimism portended a
difficult future for orthodoxy. In fact, it foreshadowed the arrival of revi-
sionism.
The rise of revisionism
During the decade after Bucharest, orthodoxy lost much of the momentum
that had swept it into dominance. Fears of famine lessened with the spread
of the Green Revolution, and economic and demographic trends induced
increasing numbers to question the most basic assumption of orthodoxy:
that rapid population growth was a significant problem. Funding changes
within the discipline and changes in the general political environment worked
to improve the reception given these critics. By the end ofthe decade a stream
of this critical thought had been labeled "revisionism."
Demeny (1986: 474) sees two dimensions to revisionism. On the sur-
face it is simply optimism about whether (extreme revisionism) or to what
extent (moderate revisionism) rapid population growth hinders develop-
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ment. Beneath the surface he detects a belief that the "invisible hand" (market
forces) works to shape population processes in ways that correspond to the
needs of society. This second dimension might be overstated, but those re-
visionists offering theoretical rationales for their optimism do often highlight
the beneficial nature of many market-induced feedbacks to population
change (National Research Council, 1986: 88-89).
Internal factors
But changes in empirical conditions more than in theoretical predispositions
lay behind revisionism's rise. Orthodoxy had difficulty digesting the optimistic
economic and demographic trends of the 1970s. Samuel Preston (1987: 628-
634), for example, explained the fall-off in "alarmist" discussion by pointing
to the developing world's rapid rates of per capita economic growth (es-
pecially high in countries with market economies) and its declining fertility.
The National Research Council's Population Growth and Econotnic Development:
Policy Questions (1986), a document refiecting both dimensions of revisionism,
noted on its first page the developing world's falling total fertility rate (from
6.2 in 1950-55 to 4.1 in 1980-85) and on page 5 the positive annual growth
rates of real gross domestic product per capita (ranging from 2.4 percent to
3.5 percent for the entire developing world over the period 1950-60 to 1965-
70 and approximating 5.5 percent in the East Asia and Pacific region over
the period 1965-81). On this empirical basis the pessimism endemic to works
relating population and development from the time of Coale and Hoover's
1958 study was laid open to doubt (1986: 4): "But it is clear that despite
rapid population growth, developing countries have achieved unprecedented
levels of income per capita, literacy, and life expectancy over the past 25
years."
There had always been certain empirical facts that questioned orthodox
assumptions. The near-zero correlation between population growth and per
capita economic growth within the developing world that led Preston (1987:
628) to conclude "population growth could not be an overriding factor in
economic growth" had been noted 20 years earlier by Kuznets (1967: 190-
191) and Richard Easterlin (1967). The continued lack of statistical associ-
ation between these two variables during the 1970s and 1980s gradually
changed examination of this relationship into a revisionist enterprise: atten-
tion became focused on explaining the lack of association. In a similar fashion
the construction of models of demographic-economic relations assumed a
revisionist tinge. Early models showing a strong negative impact of population
growth on development (Enke, 1963) were known to produce dramatically
different results with but slight changes in initial assumptions (Leibenstein,
1969). After a decade of spreading fertility decline and continued economic
growth, newer models incorporated changes in initial assumptions that less-
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ened the impact of population (Ahlburg, 1987: 314). Some, most notably
Julian Simon (1977,1981), were so emboldened by these trends as to present
true heresy: population growth stimulates economic growth. Increasingly
they were given a serious hearing.
A growing number of empirical studies also raised doubts about many
orthodox assumptions. Orthodoxy assumed that high dependency ratios
would increase expenditures for education and health and thereby reduce
the funds available for more immediately productive investments. T. Paul
Schultz (1987) found no clear relationship between percent of gross national
product invested in education and age structure or rates of population growth.
Orthodoxy assumed that high fertility would produce low rates of savings;
Allen Kelley (1973) and Andrew Mason (1987, 1988) found the actual
relationship more complicated than that. Children were not just a short-term
source of expenditure for parents; they often could be a long-term form of
"risk protection" (Cain, 1983) or even a kind of "savings" (Hammer, 1984).
When the catastrophes predicted for a quarter of a century by orthodoxy
never arrived, its assumptions were subjected to an increasingly sophisticated
scrutiny.
With the aura of crisis surrounding population growth dissipating, the
consensus it had bred ended. Agreement about the severity of the population
problem had smoothed over tensions arising from the contradictory demands
of objectivity and advocacy. The mid-century need for evidence documenting
a demand for birth control might have led to the construction of less-than-
objective KAP surveys, ones that inflated the number of potential users of
contraception (Hauser, 1967:404; Marino, 1971). The need during the 1960s
for successful family plarming projects might have led researchers at the
Population Council to tout demonstration projects as successes and not ac-
curately portray their strengths and weaknesses (Warwick 1982: 62):
A staff member reported constant tension between those who wanted to show
the usefulness of family planning and those who favored objective analysis of
results no matter what their direction. Another individual was even more
critical: "The evaluation is hogwash—it is like the KAP surveys. There is a
conflict of interest between research and mission. There are strong pressures
to slant the results toward selling the program."
As long as all agreed about the severity of the population problem, such
conflicts tended to be resolved in favor of advocacy.
When that consensus broke in the 1970s, the tensions between ad-
vocacy and objectivity became less easily contained. Authors of orthodox
works could no longer presume that readers would share their assumptions.
The reception given the World Bank's World Development Report 1984, a
sophisticated and moderate orthodox work with a developmentalist bent,
illustrates the point. In a review symposium in this journal (Vol. 11, no. 1,
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1985) Easterlin, in the first of three major reviews, calls the report a "brief
for the World Bank's official position" (p. 115) that places an incorrectly
high priority on the need for family planning programs in poor countries
and inappropriately legitimizes coercive "beyond family plarming" measures
(p. 119). Colin Clark (p. 120) finds the whole report "Malthusianism in
retreat." Ronald Lee questions the Report's scholarship (pp. 128-129), calling
it a "position paper for a point of view" that "brushed aside without serious
consideration" a number of "revisionist views." Positive assessments are
found only in the section devoted to brief "Comments."
External factors
The end of orthodoxy's hegemony within American demography, however,
was not due simply to the presence of demographic and economic trends.
These trends could be given an orthodox interpretation (Menken, 1986).
The developing world's annual population growth rate for 1980-85 was
2.00percent, virtually identical with what it had been in 1930-55 (2.10per-
cent). For sub-Saharan Africa that rate had increased over a full percentage
point with no evidence of a fall in fertility (National Research Council, 1986:
3). Much needed to be done. The actual declines in fertility occurring during
the 1970s could be viewed as finally documenting the plausibility of ortho-
doxy's solution (Lapham and Mauldin, 1983); China's experience proved
that government-sponsored fertility control efforts could work even in pre-
dominately agrarian societies. The negative association of total fertility rates
and rates of increase in per capita income emerging within the developing
world could be viewed as documenting the economic benefits of lower fertility
(Coale, 1986: 98-99). There was even a growing consensus among Third
World governments that rapid population growth significantly hindered de-
velopment (Nortman, 1983: 8), indicating final acceptance of orthodoxy's
message by its primary audience. With strong institutional support, orthodoxy
could have held sway within American demography. The optimistic trends
of the 1970s need not have proved more antithetical to its hegemony than
the pessimistic ones of the 1930s and 1960s.
Institutional support, however, did not remain strong. The International
Conference on Population at Mexico City in 1984 might have been what
orthodoxy had hoped for Bucharest: a politically neutral occasion at which
fertility control was universally acclaimed. But the US delegation ended that
hope with a revisionist pronouncement: "First and most important, popu-
lation growth is, of itself, a neutral phenomenon. It is not necessarily good
or ill" (United States, 1984: 376). The changed position of the US delegation
between 1974 and 1984 was not a simple refiection of changes in Third
World economic and demographic conditions. Other factors clearly played
a role. Similarly, external factors played a role in the end of orthodoxy's
hegemony within American demography.
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A changed funding environment The theoretical course taken by Amer-
ican demography is largely detemiined by the work of academic demogra-
phers, those who train the discipline's future practitioners. Demography had
successfully made a beachhead in American graduate education by 1970 due
to high levels of foundation and govemment funding. The survival of the
discipline, though, required the continual influx of outside funds since ini-
tially few universities were willing to subsidize it internally. Well into the
1970s demography was forced to be a reactive discipline responding quickly
to changes in govemment and foundation funding decisions. Such changes
happened with an uncotnfortable frequency.
For a variety of reasons foundation support of demography shrank
dramatically during the 1970s. Ideological shifts, such as John D. Rockefeller
3rd's developmentalist conversion, occurred. But even before Bucharest, the
Ford and Rockefeller Foundations had already significantly cut back their
funding of population activities. Apparently the stock market collapse of the
early 1970s, which "dramatically affected" their finances, played a role (Cald-
well and Caldwell, 1986: 134). By 1980 their population activities had been
greatly scaled down. The Population Council, itself greatly affected by these
moves, was forced to consider phasing out its graduate fellowship program
and did finally have to significantly reduce its size (Kritz, 1988: 9, Table 1).
No doubt foundations assumed there would be less need for their funds
with US govemment spending on population reaching major proportions by
the early 1970s. With respect to advanced training and research, though,
this assumption proved somewhat mistaken since both "USAID and the Ford
Foundation, the major supporters ofthe U.S. population centers, phased out
such support by the end ofthe 1970s" (Kritz, 1988: 9). Additionally, during
the 1970s university-based centers increasingly found themselves competing
with for-profit corporations for the available USAID contract research. Re-
lying on USAID funding became a risky way of supporting population center
activities. Grants from the Center for Population Research of the National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development continued to provide core
support for university population programs and fellowships for American
students. Competition for them was great, however, and renewal became
largely dependent upon high research output (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1986:
145). The $16 million granted by the Hewlett and Mellon Foundations for
international population work from 1978 to 1987 (Kritz, 1988: 12) has
sustained some interest in this topic at American population centers but,
overall, such interest has declined (Demeny, 1988: 477) along with its
funding.
Academic demography reacted to funding vagaries by becotning leaner,
more embedded within the university framework, and less policy oriented:
"During the 1970s most programs decided that their future lay in becoming
orthodox disciplinary components ofthe universities. Even among the great-
est enthusiasts for changing the world there was a growing concem with
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objectivity and with playing a greater role within the university than outside
it" (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1986: 144). With advancement dependent upon
scholarly output, demographers came to emphasize social scientific quality,
not policy relevance, in their research. This altered structural setting diffused
American demography's former focus on orthodox concerns and lessened
institutional constraints inhibiting a critical examination of orthodox as-
sumptions. An outside constituency was developing eager for such critiques.
A changed political environment Federal government support for ortho-
doxy, measured by amounts appropriated for fertility control work, did not
shrink like that of foundations during the 1970s, but doubts arose about the
future. Supporting fertility control efforts began to entail costs for politicians.
President Richard Nixon lost few votes in 1970 by signing the Family Planning
and Population Research Act. By 1973, though, an amendment was passed
that barred the use of funds when abortion was involved. As the abortion
controversy grew in political significance, sensitivity to a range of repro-
ductive issues was heightened.
The Supreme Court's 1973 decision legalizing abortion spawned the
Right to Life movement. Within two years a national organization had been
created of significant political strength. Although a constitutional amendment
outlawing abortion proved beyond its power, the movement was able to
have laws passed forbidding the use of public funds for abortions and to
induce a significant proportion of politicians to publicly oppose abortion and
the provision of contraceptives to minors without parental approval. A set
of reproductive issues proved capable of mobilizing social conservatives, often
religiously motivated, across denominational and regional boundaries. A
reproductive plank was added to the platform of the New Right.
During the early 1960s orthodoxy would have been little troubled by
the reproductive litmus test of the New Right since voluntary family planning
(not including abortion) was its prescription for fertility control. But when
doubts had surfaced over whether population control would succeed dem-
ocratically (Davis, 1967), some had argued that propaganda, incentives,
maybe even disincentives might be needed. Garrett Hardin (1968), with his
evocative image of the Commons, provided the rationale for moving beyond
family planning: pursuit of individual interest can, at times, work against
the collective interest. Those believing that high fertility significantly wors-
ened the commonweal thought governments might have the right (perhaps
the duty) to limit individual reproductive freedom.
When a number of Asian countries actually moved in this direction
during the 1970s, orthodoxy faced a dilemma. These programs, especially
China's and Singapore's, proved that remarkably quick fertility reductions
were possible. Yet stories of Indian teenagers being forcibly given vasectomies
and images of Chinese women, seven months pregnant, being coerced into
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accepting abortions provoked outrage in most Americans, including many
demographers. Heralding these programs as great successes or as blueprints
for others to follow promised to be politically dangerous. Once millions had
their fertility restricted, the academic dehate over the seriousness of the
population problem assumed deepened political and ethical dimensions.
Among the orthodox a remarkable silence came to surround the issue.
Social conservatives wishing to gamer support for their domestic
agenda, however, were not silent about these stories. They were potent
weapons. Connections to the domestic political agenda could be made. Were
not US taxpayers' monies supporting these programs, and even if not directly
paying for abortions did they not "free up" the monies that did? When
publicly funded family planning clinics in the United States gave contracep-
tives to minors without notifying their parents, was not our government
similarly intervening in decisions that ought to be made by families? Were
not publicly funded abortions for the American poor a form of population
control?
Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980 by a coalition of social
and economic conservatives whose agendas only occasionally overlapped
(Jackson and Vinovskis, 1983: 79). At first the orthodoxy common to past
administrations, both conservative Republican and liberal Democratic, was
adopted (Finkle and Crane, 1985: 16-17). An Intemational Conference on
Population scheduled for an election year posed problems, however. Simply
acknowledging the existence of a population problem would be interpreted
by social conservatives as an apology for abortion and state-mandated con-
traception. The Reagan administration's embrace of revisionism was no ac-
cident. Contending that population growth produced no great detrimental
effect on development efforts undercut the rationale for all "beyond family
planning" programs. A firm position opposing them and abortion could
thereby be adopted. Contending that economic stagnation was more the
result of excessive state control of the economy than of population growth
could simultaneously gamer the support of economic conservatives. The
success of market-oriented Pacific-rim economies and the poor performance
of state-controlled ones had clearly reduced the salience of orthodoxy's Cold
War arguments.
Revisionism gained exposure from the administration's embrace. With
orthodoxy still holding sway in Congress, sounds from the academic debate
reverberated in the policy arena. Because of support by the United Nations
Fund for Population Activities of family plarming activities in China, the
United States stopped contributing to the Fund. When articles on abortion
continued to appear in Intemational Family Planning Perspectives, its govem-
ment subsidy was ended. Such were the actions of an administration that
used revisionism to relieve concern about a population crisis so as to more
easily advance a domestic political agenda. They drew more criticism than
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praise from academic demographers and confirmed in the minds of many
the desirability of moving the discipline away from dependence on govern-
ment funds.
Conclusions
A combination of factors, intemal and external, lay behind the emergence
of orthodoxy and the rise of revisionism. Changes in demographic conditions
requiring the modification of old theories, and changes in concerns altering
what demographers looked at and how they went about "seeing," both
occurred. Currently the relationship between population and development,
the central topic of demography since the time of Malthus, is being ap-
proached from many directions. While revisionists question the existence of
a demographic stumbling block to development and the orthodox applaud
their success at reducing its size, others are reviving transition theory and
are isolating development "thresholds" associated with fertility decline (Kirk,
1971; Coale, 1973, 1984; Cecheli and Kirk, 1973; Beaver, 1973; Caldwell,
1976; Cutright and Hargens, 1984). Still others, spurred on by uniformly
low and often below-replacement fertility levels, are redirecting attention to
the population/development interactions of the developed world (Espen-
shade, 1978; Campbell, 1979; Davis, Bemstam, and Ricardo-Campbell,
1986).
Does the current multiplicity of concerns, questions, and assumptions
indicate that demography in the United States is undergoing a fundamental
shift in direction? What will be the discipline's perspective on population
and development at the close of the present century? These are questions
not easily answered. Few of the formulators of transition theory in 1943
would have predicted the rise of orthodoxy a decade later. Few at Bucharest
in 1974 would have predicted the US delegation's position at Mexico City
in 1984. Few now can predict what questions demographers will seek to
answer at the end of the century, what significance they will draw from
analysis of trends, or what policy import their findings will have. Perhaps a
global recession will stall fertility decline and begin a period of clear negative
association between rates of increase in population and per capita income.
Perhaps fear of depopulation will evoke calls to demographers for repro-
ductive survival plans. With the discipline's course infiuenced by an interplay
of intemal and external factors, the one certainty is that periodic shifts in
perspective will continue.
Note
An earlier version of this article was written Orleans, 21-23 April 1988, as part of the ses-
for and presented at the Annual Meeting of sion "Two centuries after Malthus: The his-
the Population Association of America, New tory of demography."
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